When are Public Employees not Really Public Employees - In the Aftermath of \u3cem\u3eGarcetti v. Ceballos\u3c/em\u3e by Paetzold, Ramona L.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 6
9-1-2008
When are Public Employees not Really Public
Employees - In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos
Ramona L. Paetzold
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ramona L. Paetzold, When are Public Employees not Really Public Employees - In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 First Amend. L.
Rev. 92 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol7/iss1/6
WHEN ARE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES NOT REALLY
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES?
IN THE AFTERMATH OF GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS
RAMONA L. PAETZOLD*
In business schools the corporate model of employment reigns,
job performance and business efficiency are considered as the ultimate
goals, and deference to the employer is understood as the norm.
Business students (perhaps mirroring views of a broader public) often
gripe about government waste and inefficiency. They are happy that
they will be working in the private sector, where they assume that all
rewards are merit-based and they will undoubtedly display the merit
necessary to achieve personal success. Students often assume that public
and private employees face the same issues and concerns. These students
do not reflect on the reasons why the public workplace might be
qualitatively different from the private one.' Instead, private and public
Professor Ramona L. Paetzold holds both D.B.A. and J.D. degrees and is
Professor of Management and Mays Research Fellow in the Mays Business School
at Texas A & M University.
1. There are certainly differences between the private and public sectors that
could justify different human resource practices. For example, the public sector is
neither profit-oriented nor competitive, as is the private sector. Thus, it would be
possible that efficiency in employment costs would be less likely to be realized in
the public sector, as is the myth or stereotype. This notion is based on the idea that
public employees are overly motivated by a need for job security (regardless of their
level of performance) and do not seek or obtain the high levels of achievement and
performance that private employees do. An early study by Charles T. Goodsell
demonstrated that these views are unlikely to be true. Thus, even though there may
be rationales for business students' (and others') perceptions that public employment
is less efficient or satisfying, there is at least some data that suggest that these
perceptions are mere negative stereotypes. See generally CHARLES T. GOODSELL,
THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY: A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION POLEMIC (1983)
(demonstrating that public employees, contrary to misconception, were not driven by
job security needs to the extent that private employees were, were less motivated by
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employees are viewed as essentially fungible in the roles that they
perform. The entire concept of a public employee as playing a dual
role-worker and societal/public watchdog-is virtually never
considered unless I raise it as part of a class discussion. (And, without an
increased emphasis on the teaching of ethics in business schools, the
"public watchdog" role that even private employees should be viewed as
playing in society may be overlooked by these students.)
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,3 the Supreme Court, like a typical
business student, similarly fails to consider the important distinctions
between private and public employment. The decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, involving a calendar deputy4 who was allegedly retaliated
against for bringing to the attention of his supervisors a potential
deficiency in an affidavit underlying a search warrant,' demonstrates
more of a concern with job performance and business efficiency than
with the important societal role that public employees, or at least some
public employees, play. Importantly, by issuing a bright-line rule as to
6when public employees lose First Amendment free speech protection,
pay and benefits than private employees, and were more concerned generally with
self-actualization than private sector employees); James W. Driscoll et al., Private
Managers and Public Myths-Public Managers and Private Myths, 21 SLOAN
MGMT. REv. 53 (1979) (finding that most public-sector managers approach their
jobs in the same manner as private-sector managers would and that stereotypes of
the two groups tend to frustrate business-government relations). Of course,
Goodsell's findings could be the result of rationalization to avoid cognitive
dissonance-i.e., knowing they are compensated less, the public employees that he
studied might have developed beliefs that they were not motivated by compensation
but instead obtained intangible rewards from their employment that somehow "made
up" for their lack of pay. Or, Goodsell's findings could suggest that at least some
individuals may seek public employment precisely because they are actually
motivated to seek self-actualization (e.g., via public service) instead of higher pay.
See infra notes 41, 48.
2. Except, of course, business students believe that they will make much more
money in the private sector, which they often link with greater job and life
satisfaction.
3. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
4. A calendar deputy aids the clerk of the court in all duties, especially filing
papers in legal actions and proceedings and helping to maintain records of the court
history.
5. Garcetti, 457 U.S. at 414-15.
6. Id. at 421.
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the Court creates an artificial dichotomy between the status of official
job duties or responsibilities and other important duties or
responsibilities that a public employee must provide.7
My article is not about First Amendment protections per se, but is
instead about the employment issues raised by the Garcetti decision.
Because the Garcetti case has been summarized at length in this
symposium issue as well as in other arenas,8 1 will not undergo a lengthy
summarization here. Instead, I will simply state the result in Section A,
indicating how it differs from prior decision-making regarding public
employee speech protection. In that section I will also raise three
concerns or issues that arise in conjunction with interpretation of the
bright-line ruling: (1) the construction of a citizen/employee dichotomy,
(2) the problem of determining when speech is compelled in the
workplace, and (3) the importance of considering to whom speech
related to job duties is addressed. I will then indicate in Section B why I
believe that this decision leaves public employees in a legal position
7. For example, public employees may help to keep the public informed of
wrongdoing in governmental organizations or may assist the governmental
organization itself to be aware of mismanagement or inefficiencies in service
provision. Postal carriers may assist in the redesigning of routes and provide ideas
for mail handling, even though their official job duty is to deliver the mail.
University professors may influence the myriad ways in which a university operates,
even though their official job duties are to teach classes and engage in research. In
this article I do not question or evaluate the important functions that public
employees play in alerting the public to matters of public concern such as fraud,
waste, or other misconduct; instead, I take it quite for granted.
8. See the articles in this symposium issue. See generally, Patrick M. Garry,
The Constitutional Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining
the Due Process Rights of Government Employees in Light of the Public Employee
Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 797 (2007) (arguing that due process rights
of public employees should hinge on whether employee is acting as employee or as
citizen after Garcetti); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical
Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561
(2008) (concluding that Garcetti is flawed in over-protecting government as
employer); Joseph 0. Oluwole, Eras in Public Employment-Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 32 VT. L. REV. 317 (2007) (examining the whistleblowing rights of
teachers in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence); Julie A. Wenell, Garcetti v.
Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the Public Workplace, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 623 (2007) (criticizing the Garcetti decision as unduly restricting public
employees' First Amendment rights).
fVol. 7
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similar to that of private employees, the latter being a group that is
known to have little protection for speech in the workplace. Finally,
Section C demonstrates how limiting the Garcetti decision can be for
public employees, restricting them to only statutory remedies. In
general, statutory remedies have been particularly limited for private
employees in recent years. First, the Supreme Court has generally
indicated a hostility toward litigation in the employment arena. 9 Second,
federal courts tend to show deference to private employers when it
comes to determinations of job responsibilities and duties and employee
rights. 10 Thus, one implication of Section C is that by increasing their
resemblance to private employees, the Supreme Court has also limited
statutory remedies for public employees.
A. THE GARCETTI DECISION
AND PROBLEMATIC ISSUES FOR INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court held in Garcetti that although public
employees have a First Amendment right to make "contributions to the
civic discourse[,] '"' First Amendment protection disappears when they
instead speak in accordance with their official job duties.12 Prior to
Garcetti, courts analyzed public employee speech by first determining
whether the speech was offered as a private citizen on a "matter[] of
public concern . . . . 3 If it was, then the Connick/Pickering balancing
test required that the speech be protected unless the employer "had an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any
9. See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600
(2004) (holding that there is no age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act when older workers are treated better than younger workers within
the protected class); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162,
2169 (2007) (holding that for pay discrimination cases, the filing deadline begins
when the pay decision is made instead of seeing each paycheck as a new, actionable
wrong under Title VII); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) (holding
that the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, but holding that the neutral practice in question
need only be reasonable instead of justified by business necessity).
10. See infra notes 32-33.
11. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
12. Id. at 421.
13. Id. at 419.
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other member of the general public."' 14 As a result of Garcetti, courts
must first decide whether the speech is made as a result of the official,
specific job duties of the public employee-not whether the employee is
speaking in the role of a "citizen." Neither the fact that the speech
occurs at the workplace, nor that it addresses work-related issues, is
dispositive.' 5 Certain public employee speech is rendered unprotected if
. .. 16
it is spoken "pursuant to" the employee's official responsibilities.
A few problematic interpretive concerns are immediately raised
by this bright-line ruling. First, the Court creates an artificial dichotomy
between two "roles" that a public employee plays. Although it is clear
that when a person becomes "employed" he or she is an "employee" by
definition, it is not clear that speech by that employee can easily be
separated into two meaningfully distinct categories-that of a "citizen"
(who is nonetheless still an employee) alerting the public to, or
protecting the public from, the problematic inner workings of a federal,
state, or local employer, and that of an employee (who is nonetheless still
a citizen) performing his or her official job duties. Simply because
speech may fulfill the latter does not mean that it cannot fulfill the
former. Certainly it is the content and nature of the speech that should
determine its value under the First Amendment, and not whether it is
offered by a public employee qua employee or qua citizen. 17
In Garcetti, Ceballos' speech served both to alert his employer to
potential problems with a search warrant and simultaneously to protect
the public from a district attorney's office that allegedly based a search
warrant on a perjured affidavit. 18 There are many constituencies or
14. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (discussing both Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.138
(1983) and Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563
(1968)).The Connick/Pickering balancing test consists of two inquiries: first, was the
public employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern? If the answer
is yes, then the courts must also consider the second inquiry: did the governmental
employer have an adequate justification for the manner in which it treated the
employee?
15. Id. at 420-21.
16. Id. at 421.
17. Justice Stevens adopted this view in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 427
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "it is senseless to let constitutional protection
for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description").
18. In fact, even though the trial court rejected the challenge to the warrant,
Ceballos' concerns about the affidavit gave rise to a hearing to challenge the
[Vol. 7
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stakeholders that may have an interest in a public employee's speech,
even when it is made pursuant to official job duties. Indeed, that is the
essence of the "matter of public concern" test traditionally governing
public employee speech-the general public can be an interested
stakeholder. 19 In Garcetti, the general public had an interest in knowing
about inappropriate or illegal conduct in the district attorney's office;
Garcetti's speech served the purpose of protecting the public from
reliance on perjured documents. The fact that his speech was "official"
did not strip it of its relevance to the general citizenry; the speech still
focused on a matter of public concern. The fact that Garcetti was an
employee did not reduce his speech to a trivial workplace complaint.
Nor did the fact that he was an employee suggest that he could not be
speaking as an interested private citizen himself.2 As long as the general
citizenry represents an interested stakeholder, speech made in the
performance of official job duties should not lose First Amendment
protection-it is in furtherance of the public good.
Second, Garcetti does not provide sufficient guidance on the
meaning of "duty" for purposes of determining how an employee's
speech is a part of his or her job. Employees may speak on a variety of
topics, but some of that speech is discretionary. Official job duties do
not necessarily compel speech on a particular topic. For example,
Ceballos may not have been required to report irregularities in the basis
for obtaining the search warrant, even though speech regarding the
search warrant was within the purview of his job duties and thus made
"pursuant to" them. He could have simply remained quiet or perhaps
declined to review the search warrant issue raised by the defense
attorney21 (and in this case, presumably the district attorney's office
warrant. Id. at 414-15. The fact that the trial court rejected the challenge does not
diminish the fact that Ceballos' efforts were serving the public interest.
19. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419; see also supra text accompanying note 13.
20. To be deserving of First Amendment protection, the public employee's
speech traditionally had to be offered in the employee's role as a private citizen. Id.
21. In Garcetti, Ceballos acknowledged that "it was not unusual for defense
attorneys to ask calendar deputies to investigate aspects of pending cases." Id. at
414. Both sides conceded that Ceballos' investigation and challenge of the search
warrant were part of his official job duties, so there was no discussion of the degree
of discretion Ceballos might have had. Id. at 424.
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would have preferred he take that route).22 Similarly, the treasurer of a
public agency may choose to express a concern about the fact that
expenditures are accruing more rapidly in March than in February, but he
or she may not be required to report this information on a monthly
basis-the speech is discretionary, even if he or she is at some pointS23
required to give such an accounting. Many employees, including
public employees, enjoy a certain amount of discretion in their jobs.
Although the Court indicates that speaking about the subject matter of
the job is not dispositive, it is unclear as to whether speech pertaining to
the subject matter of the job is actually a duty in the ordinary and legal
sense of the word as an obligation unless there is a finding of required
speech within the official job duties. Thus, the Court could be using the
word "duty" more broadly than in the sense of a compelled activity or
24
obligation, leaving the door open for lower courts to do the same.
Instead of imposing such a broad conception of a public
employee's job duties, reviewing courts should consider the amount of
discretion a public employee is allowed to exercise in deciding to speak.
The more discretion the employee has, the less the speech should look
like it was "made pursuant to" or in accordance with official job duties
because it is less likely that such speech was actually compelled. This
consideration could remove much employee speech from the sweep of
Garcetti, so that a lack of precision in the Court's holding may actually
render Garcetti less restrictive of First Amendment protections than it
might otherwise be.
Third, the decision raises the issue of to whom the speech must be
addressed to be seen as falling within the public employee's official job
22. If the district attorney's office took the position that Ceballos should not
have questioned the search warrant and/or should have declined to investigate, then
arguably it was not a requirement of his job that he do so.
23. For example, he or she may be required to produce quarterly reports, not
monthly ones. Nonetheless, his or her comments would be made "pursuant to"
official job duties-as treasurer, he or she would have access to this information in a
way that no other agency official would and it would be considered a function of his
or her job to report expenditures.
24. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a duty is, inter alia, "[a]n
act or a course of action that is required of one by position . . ." or "[a] service,
function, or task assigned to one . AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 431 (2d
College ed. 1991).
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duties-i.e., is speech to be considered as part of official job duties when
it is offered "unofficially"? 25 When Ceballos notified his supervisors of
the problems that arose with the affidavit, he was logically, and perhaps
as required, reporting within the chain of command. Suppose Ceballos
had instead expressed his concerns to a coworker, who then discussed
them with Ceballos' supervisors. Because Ceballos himself would not
have engaged in the speech with his supervisors, would he still have lost
his First Amendment protection? Or would his speech then not have
been made within the requirements of or "pursuant to" his official job
duties since the concerns would have only been expressed voluntarily
and informally? Similarly, would the treasurer of the public agency
receive First Amendment protection for any comments about
expenditures if they were made to another employee of the agency who
was not in the reporting chain of command, but who subsequently
repeated the attributed comments to the relevant oversight committee?
Speech concerning official job duties need not be made directly to
persons in supervisory or managerial positions within the organization.
Employees may instead vet their concerns or complaints with other
members of their social network, particularly coworkers who may share
similar concerns or be subject to similar work experiences. Most speech
that managers would consider undesirable or disruptive probably
circulates in this manner. In addition, employees may direct their speech
to coworkers first, before offering it to supervisors. At what point would
the public employee lose protection for the speech-when voluntarily
offered to coworkers, or when directly given to supervisors? The
Supreme Court did not provide guidelines for when speech could be
found to be "pursuant to" that employee's official job duties. Because
this issue did not arise in Garcetti, but could reasonably be expected to
arise in subsequent cases, there remains uncertainty regarding the effect
of more casual employee discussion in public organizations. This
uncertainty will likely produce a chilling effect on social interaction and
25. In Garcetti, the only situation considered by the Court involved a calendar
deputy speaking to his supervisors. The Court did not face the issue of whether
speech made pursuant to official job duties-speech that would otherwise be
recognized as falling within the purview of the employee's job-could consist of
conversations with persons internal to the organization but outside of the supervisory
chain of command.
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collegiality among coworkers due to fears that mere rumor or innuendo
could result in job loss.
In summary, the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes
speech made pursuant to official job duties makes the scope of Garcetti,
and its impact on the lower courts, difficult to determine. Garcetti leaves
us without a clear understanding of when employee speech is part of or
sufficiently relates to performance of official job duties so as to lose First
Amendment protection. The resulting uncertainty regarding which
speech is undeserving of protection, coupled with Garcetti's explicit
restrictions on public employee speech, have a chilling effect on speech,
speech that has the potential to be beneficial to the public more
generally. Further, this chilling effect is similar to that felt by private
employees, as discussed below.
B. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AS PRIVATE EMPLOYEES
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court saw issues of efficiency, employer
control, and employee discipline as paramount to even the public
workplace, noting that although public employees may at times
contribute to public discourse, they are not allowed to "perform their jobs
however they see fit.",26 This concern for the public employer's right to
maintain efficiency was coupled with a judicial hostility toward allowing
federal courts to intrusively interfere or second guess the public
employer's judgments regarding how best to achieve that efficiency in
public functioning.27 Although the Court cloaked this animosity toward
judicial oversight in the language of federalism and separation of
28 2powers -a concern related only to public employers 9-the truth is that
federal courts indicate the same level of hostility toward intruding into
private employer's domains to set behavioral standards and determine
26. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
27. Id.
28. The Court indicated a disdain for a "new, permanent, and intrusive role"
that would "mandat[e] judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official business." Id. at
423.
29. The Court appeared to be concerned with federal overreaching into those
areas reserved to state and/or local governments. Id.
[Vol. 7
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workplace efficiency. For example, the Seventh Circuit has often stated
that courts should not second guess private employer's personnel
3 0 31judgments, and it is not alone. Considerable deference is given to
private employers-and presumably will be given to public employers-
to establish conduct standards as requirements of the job, and these
conduct standards may well implicate speech.
32
As has been well-discussed elsewhere, private employees have
very few speech rights in the workplace.33 For example, the public
policy exception to employment-at-will virtually never reaches private
employee speech because the speech is viewed as a "private concern"
between the employer and the employee.34 Few explicit statutes govern
private whistleblowers, and the statutory exceptions are numerous and
vary state to state.35 For the most part, then, private employees may be
dismissed if they engage in unacceptable speech in the workplace. Their
consolation prize is that they may still be allowed to receive
36
unemployment benefits.
30. See, e.g., Cardoso v. Robert Bosch Corp., 427 F.3d 429, 435 (2005)
(noting under Title VII that "[a]s we have often stated-to a host of deaf ears, it
often seems-the court is not a super-personnel department intervening whenever an
employee feels he is being treated unjustly") (internal quotations omitted).
31. See, e.g., Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 523 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that "courts do not review
the wisdom or fairness of employers' business judgments"); Mason v. Avaya
Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[i]n cases
arising under the ADA, we do not sit as a super personnel department that second
guesses employers' business judgments") (internal quotations omitted).
32. This deference is quite broad, encompassing the spectrum of federal anti-
discrimination law. See supra notes 30-31.
33. For an overview, see RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 88 (2007); STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 225 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter WILLBORN].
34. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988)
(noting that "[w]hen the duty of an employee to disclose information to his employer
serves only the private interest of the employer, the rationale underlying the Tameny
cause of action is not implicated").
35. For a quick discussion, see WILLBORN, supra note 33, at 149-52.
36. See, e.g., Meehan v. Lull Corp., 466 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(machinist who called the corporation "brain dead" not disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits because his conduct was considered neither willful nor
wanton).
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Public employees in professional managerial and/or supervisory
roles, where job descriptions indicate a responsibility to speak about
issues pertaining to the workplace, are at greatest risk from the Garcetti
decision and therefore most strongly resemble private employees. In
private employment, managerial and supervisory employees are
recognized as having relatively ill-defined job duties, usually involving a
fair amount of discretion, and therefore they are difficult to monitor and
their performance levels are difficult to measure. As a result, they are
often compensated with what are known as efficiency or above-market
wages in order to provide incentives for them to monitor themselves,
avoid slacking, and in general achieve high levels of performance.
37
There are two ways to interpret this form of compensation. First, as
private employers and economists would argue, and as stated above,
higher-than-normal wages provide incentives for these supervisory and
high-level employees to perform their jobs in ways that are consistent
with organizational efficiency. Second, however, these higher wages
may also be intended to create disincentives for private employees to
speak out in ways that the organization would find unacceptable, because
the higher wages make job loss more costly. In other words, managerial
and supervisory employees are arguably paid not just to be high-
performing, but also to "keep their mouths shut" about problems within
the organization.
This creates a Catch-22 for higher-level private employees.
Although it can be argued that they are compensated for the risk they
take when they engage in speech about private workplace problems-
speech that might be part of their official job duties, and thus speech that
should be encouraged-they also have disincentives to engage in such
speech, particularly if it is likely that the organization would be
displeased with what they have to say. Thus, as long as these employees
37. See generally Peter Cappelli & Keith Chauvin, An Interplant Test of the
Efficiency Wage Hypothesis, 106 Q.J. ECON. 769 (1991) (finding that efficiency
wages are associated with lower levels of shirking or other unproductive behaviors);
David Chamy & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for "High-Level"
Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (1998) (examining efficiency wages as an
"attractor" for certain types of employees in the context of understanding
employment discrimination law).
[Vol. 7
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have discretion about what to say and/or how to frame their remarks, the
fear of losing their job may actually keep them from speaking about
important workplace issues. There is a chilling effect on speech
associated with efficiency wages that may parallel the chilling effect on
public employee speech that is found to be made pursuant to their official
job duties.
It is unclear how these chilling effects compare. Perhaps the
Supreme Court's decision can be viewed as equalizing the risk of
speaking for high-level private and public employees. 38 But what if the
risk of job loss for public employees is now actually greater as a result of
Garcetti? And, given the chilling effect of higher-than-market wages,
any attempt to compensate public employees for the risk of job-related
speech created by Garcetti could result in even less speech from public
employees-a clearly undesirable outcome. What is clear is that public
employees pre-Garcetti were not being compensated for any risk that
Garcetti has since created. These issues were not considered by the
Supreme Court, but the potential value to the public of public employee
speech, even when it is pursuant to official job duties, requires careful
consideration of the relative chilling effects on private and public
employee speech. It would certainly be ironic if a greater chilling effect
exists for high-level public employees.
Indeed, public employees in general may never have been
compensated sufficiently for the broad tasks that they perform. It may
well be that part of the more profound motivation for seeking and
holding a position in the public sector is, as noted by Justice Souter, to
38. Relative levels of pay between private and public employees would be a
consideration here. It seems likely that public employees make less than their
private counterparts due to lack of resources, restrictive pay grades, promotion
policies, etc. However, one study has indicated that there is actually higher pay in
the public sector for employees having higher education levels, but that employees
having lower levels of education receive more pay in the private sector. Rebecca M.
Blank, An Analysis of Workers' Choice Between Employment in the Public and
Private Sectors, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 211, 213 (1985). Thus, it is possible
that higher-level public employees actually earn more than their private sector
counterparts, but it would be premature to conclude this based on one rather dated
study.
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seek "to unite . . . avocation and . . . vocation. Public employment
may be viewed as public service; the importance of speaking critically
from the insider's perspective may be what leads at least some people to
public employment in the first place. Many public employees feel a
strong commitment to providing the services that only governmental
agencies and organizations seem to make available.40  The Garcetti
decision is in conflict with the public employee as public servant
metaphor, putting these employees in a particular bind-the public
service aspect of the jobs that they perform has now become a very real
private hazard.
41
One argument that is commonly given for private employer
control of employee speech is that employers require loyalty from their
employees, and therefore employers discipline those workers who
engage in "disloyal" speech. 4' This is an interesting, though I believe
disingenuous argument. The issue is not loyalty per se. Today private
employers make only short-term commitments to their employees, so
that the need for "loyalty" in the traditional sense of keeping employees
on the job is greatly attenuated.43 What private employers really seek is
39. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 432 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
ROBERT FROST, Two Tramps In Mud Time (1934), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS,
PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson eds., 1995)).
40. It may be true that many individuals are better suited to work in the public
sector for that reason. For one individual's description of what it was like to leave
public employment as a city manager to enter the managerial ranks of the private
sector, see Dave Millheim, Public or Private Sector Work: The Eternal Question,
PUB. MGMT., June 1999, at 18 (discussing pros and cons of public versus private
sector employment).
41. Note that the public service aspect of a public employee's job is not solely
exemplified by external speech. Being able to speak internally about
mismanagement or other problems can be more efficient in producing change.
When internal speech is successful in eliminating fraud, waste, or other
organizational difficulties, the public benefits even though it may not have been
aware of the problems a priori.
42. What constitutes "disloyal" speech, is, of course, decided by the private
employer because the private employee has so few free speech rights. Disloyalty
could refer to speech that derogates the employer or the employer's activities, either
internally or externally to the organization. Or, it could be speech that the employer
views as disruptive to workplace activities or the workday schedule.
43. For a discussion of the "new" employment relationship between private
employees and their employers, see KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS To
[Vol. 7
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sufficient commitment from their employees so that they will perform at
high levels while employed and make the employer productive and
profitable over that relative short-term. Performance is viewed in much
broader terms than ever before, generally including both contextual as
well as task performance-i.e., "good citizen" behaviors as well as job
performance behaviors.44 These "good citizen" behaviors could easily
include "appropriate" speech, speech that represents the private
employer's values and furthers the needs or goals of the private
employer's inner or outer workings. Undesirable speech, or speech that
somehow interferes with the private employer's values, goals, or needs,
can readily be viewed as coming from uncommitted or disaffected
employees and can be labeled as counterproductive or even deviant
behavior.45 Even if the "good citizen" behaviors are excluded from
performance appraisal, as is sometimes claimed by human resource
46
managers, so that no explicit "brownie points" are given for them,
problematic and undesirable speech can easily earn performance
demerits and be the basis for discipline or dismissal. Exercising freedom
of speech is frequently synonymous with being unemployed in the
private sector. This is not about employee loyalty per se, but about the
private employer's desire for economic efficiency and workplace control.
DIGITS (2004) (examining adequacy of employment and labor laws in the context of
the modem, less long-term, relationship between employer and employee).
44. Contextual performance (sometimes referred to as organizational
citizenship behaviors) reflects those tasks that an employee performs that although
not required, are nonetheless beneficial to the organization. See, e.g., ANGELO S.
DENISI & RICKY W. GRIFFIN, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2005) at
303-04. Of course, it could be argued that private employers sometimes make
contextual performance an implicit part of an employee's official job duties, thereby
affecting performance appraisal and other outcomes that result (such as pay,
promotion, etc.). Although human resource specialists may argue that it is
unreasonable to expect contextual performance from all employees, employers
certainly benefit substantially from employees that go "the extra mile" to aid the
organization, making it likely that engaging in contextual performance can result in
more favorable appraisals for employees. See id.
45. The scholarly management literature abounds with articles discussing
various types of undesirable employee behavior, ranging from the merely "uncivil"
to "counterproductive" to "deviant." For a review, see Ricky W. Griffin & Yvette P.
Lopez, "Bad Behavior" in Organizations: A Review and Typology for Future
Research, 31 J. MGMT. 988 (2005).
46. See id.
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Public employers, on the other hand, may not have the same
concerns about loyalty or commitment. What motivates people to work
in the public sector in the first place-a desire, at least in part, to provide
public service-may be sufficient to guarantee loyalty and/orS 47
commitment. Thus, even if private employers may sanction employee
speech in the interest of promoting greater commitment, public
employers arguably do not have this same need. Public employees who
seek to serve the public may also be seeking to perform their jobs at a
high level because to accomplish one, they must do the other. The two
interests may be aligned. Although accomplishing this dual goal may, at
times, involve speaking out about problematic inner workings of the
government entity, as it did in Garcetti, there was no claim that Ceballos
was not being conscientious in the performance of his duties or that he
48
was not a competent calendar deputy. Although the Court suggests that
what happened to Ceballos was simply a matter of performance
47. Unfortunately, there are no recent, comprehensive studies of differences in
personal characteristics of those who choose public versus private employment in
the United States. A 1982 study by Barry Z. Posner and Warren H. Schmidt found
that public administrators emphasized instrumental values such as capability,
cheerfulness, helpfulness, and imagination more than private sector administrators
did. Barry Z. Posner & Warren H. Schmidt, What Kind of People Enter the Public
and Private Sectors?, HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. Summer 1982, at 35, 39. Public
administrators also placed more emphasis on terminal values such as world peace,
equality, and freedom than did private sector administrators. Id. However, the rank
order of the values was quite similar for public and private sector administrators,
suggesting more overall similarity than difference. Id. at 40. Personality profiles for
the two sets of administrators in the study were remarkably similar. Id. Of
particular interest were two key differences between public and private
administrators reflecting the importance of occupational values: being recognized for
their work and performing work that contributed to the overall societal good were
more important for public administrators. Id. This latter finding supports the notion
that public employees may be motivated by a desire for public service.
Additionally, the study by Blank, supra note 38, found that veterans and persons
of racial minority status were more likely to be employed in the public, as opposed
to the private, sector. They were also more likely to be employed in federal, as
opposed to state, government. Id. at 219. Because important social policies may be
more easily enforced at the federal level, Blank suggests that this may be an
important source of attraction for these workers. Id. at 216.
48. According to the Supreme Court's recounting, the district attorney's office
cited "legitimate reasons such as staffing needs" as the reasons for the actions taken
against Ceballos. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 415 (2006).
[Vol. 7
2008] NOT REALLY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES? 107
• 49
evaluation, the facts seem to indicate that his job periodically required
him to investigate the circumstances underlying a warrant and make
recommendations based on his investigations. He certainly complied
with this requirement. Any negative performance evaluation would
therefore seem to have been based on the manner in which he engaged in
private sector notions of contextual performance-he was not being a
"good citizen" of the district attorney's office when he expressed
opinions contrary to those of his supervisor. In other words, the private
employment model was sanctioned by the Court, without adequate
questioning of whether it actually should apply. The "good citizen" from
an external, public sector perspective may not be the "good citizen" from
an internal, private sector perspective.
The Court's focus may have been less on the public employee's
performance appraisal per se and more on the public employer's right to
speak as it wishes, a right that allows a public employer to control what it
has "commissioned or created."5 ° Protection of governmental entity
speech is, in fact, the first rationale presented by the Supreme Court for
its holding.51 Thus, the district attorney's office may have had the right
to present a unified position on the adequacy of the search warrant and
whether to proceed with criminal prosecution. The irony is that this
perspective should be related to limiting a public employee's right to
engage in speech external to the public entity instead of internal to it.
Instead, the Supreme Court's holding in Garcetti would appear to apply
primarily to internal speech, because it is when speaking internally that
49. Id. at 422 ("The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or
write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his
performance.").
50. Id.
51. Id. The Court then addresses public employers' rights to control their
operations, but notes as well that public employers have the right to guarantee that
"official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer's mission." Id. at 423 (emphasis added). Thus, a strong parallel is
created between the degree of workplace control held by private and public
employers.
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most public employees would be engaging in speech pursuant to their
52
official job duties.
Had Ceballos discussed his concerns about the affidavit
underlying the search warrant in a letter to the local newspaper, his
speech would have been akin to that of a private citizen and therefore
potentially deserving of First Amendment protection.53  But it is
precisely that type of speaking out that could thwart the efforts of the
district attorney to present a unified front regarding, and gain public
support for, a particular criminal prosecution. Ceballos instead spoke
only internally about his concerns, in a way that did not appear to affect
the district attorney's public "speech" about the prosecution, if there was
any, and in doing so lost First Amendment protection. Contrary to the
Court's concern regarding external governmental entity speech, day-to-
day control of internal workplace operations, a major private employer
concern, was made of primary importance to public employers.
In summary, the Supreme Court decision in Garcetti treats public
employees as though they are private employees, applying the notion of
private employer control of the workplace to the public sector. Public
employees no longer will feel more freedom than private employees to
speak internally about wrongdoing or inequities in their workplaces.
"Managerial discretion," a term often used in private employment law
cases, is now the mantra for public employment law cases as well.5a
C. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
Without First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant to
their official job duties, public employees now enjoy only the types of
protections that private employees enjoy for their undesirable workplace
speech. For example, they may be protected by the law regarding
wrongful dismissal (contractual or tort), intentional infliction of
52. The Court did not directly address the issue of public employees who are
required, as part of their official job duties, to make public statements. The Garcetti
holding would appear to apply to these public employees as well, however.
53. There is no indication in the case that Ceballos was required, as part of his
official job duties, to communicate with the public.
54. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (discussing giving "government employers
sufficient discretion to manage their operations").
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emotional distress, and statutory laws regarding whistle-blowing or
retaliation.55 In particular, the law of retaliation may be one of the most
fruitful routes for a public employee to take, because many substantive
statutory protections include anti-retaliation provisions within them. For
example, Title VII contains an anti-retaliation provision that the Supreme
56Court, quite uncharacteristically of late, has construed rather broadly.
Consider the case of Deanna Freitag, who worked at the Pelican
Bay State Prison, a maximum security prison, in Crescent City,
California. 57  Freitag was employed as a correctional officer in the
Secure Housing Unit (SHU), known for housing some of the state's most
violent criminals.58 Throughout her career at the SHU, Freitag was
repeatedly subjected to sexually derogatory obscenities by the inmates,
as well as their exhibitionist masturbation, either in the yard surrounding
the control tower or in the shower area. The inmates continually ignored
her orders to stop.59
Freitag made various attempts to discipline the errant inmates.
First, she completed a 115 Form disciplinary report on an inmate who
yelled sexual obscenities at her and threatened to kill her, despite the fact
60
that her direct supervisor advised her not to complete the report. She
also completed several 128 Forms for a variety of incidents of inmate
exhibitionist masturbation, including one when an inmate ejaculated on a
tray she was attempting to clear. 61 Although she attempted to discipline
one inmate with ten days of escort status, which had been approved by
the supervising captain, another lieutenant discarded the relevant 128
Form and ordered her not to do so, claiming that Freitag was the only
55. The majority opinion in Garcetti also notes that a variety of whistleblower
and labor laws could be available for public employees. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
See generally WILLBORN, supra note 34 (suggesting legal protections available to
employers).
56. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
(interpreting Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)).
57. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006).
58. Id. at 533.
59. Id. at 533-34.
60. Id. at 533. The 115 Form in this circumstance charged the inmate with
threatening a public official.
61. Id. The 128 Forms typically did not form the basis for disciplinary action
but instead are placed in inmates' files. Id.
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officer who had problems with the inmate, and in any event "it [was]
only sex."
62
Her problems with the inmates continued, and she repeatedly
filled out forms, charging at least one of the inmates with indecent
63
exposure on multiple occasions. However, she believed that her forms
were either discounted or discarded and that the violations she was
charging were being dropped or lessened. At one point she notified the
warden at Pelican Bay that her "authority and discretion [were being]
,,64
undermined. Later, she notified the associate warden in charge of the
SHU that her supervisors were dragging their feet in responding to the
sexual abuse she was enduring, requesting that the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) policy of prosecuting repeat
offenders be implemented.65
Finally, she wrote a letter to the director of CDCR, alleging that
she was working in a hostile work environment and blaming her
supervisors for their lack of support and unwillingness to stop the
66harassment. The associate warden and another official of the prison
informed her approximately one week later that she was being relieved
of duty at the SHU pending a psychiatric evaluation and that the
evaluation was necessitated by her "incoherent" allegations regarding
67harassment by the inmates. The associate warden threatened to
68terminate Freitag. Instead, however, Freitag was eventually deemed fit
to return to duty, where she was immediately subjected to exhibitionist
masturbation by one of the problematic inmates. She again filed a 115
Form and wrote a letter to the Pelican Bay Warden requesting additional
69training for dealing with inmate behavioral problems. Within two
weeks, the warden had authorized an internal affairs investigation of
Freitag, claiming that she had made "slanderous accusations against
other staff.,
70
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 534.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Freitag then filed a formal complaint under Title VII for sexual
harassment and retaliation.7' She also sent a letter to Richard Polanco, a
California state Senator, in which she complained about the sexually
abusive climate in the SHU and the lack of official support, followed by
another letter to both Polanco and the Director of the California
Department of Corrections, further describing the mistreatment she had
received by both the inmates and staff.72 Finally, the California Office of
the Inspector General (IG) began an investigation based on the
allegations in Freitag's letters, and Freitag cooperated fully in this
investigation.73
The IG ultimately published a damning report, finding that female
correctional officers were routinely subjected to lewd, exhibitionist
masturbation and that the supervisors and administrators at Pelican Bay
had neither responded appropriately to complaints nor stopped the
inappropriate behavior.74 The report criticized administrators up the
chain of command, noting that the warden had taken no actions to stop
the sexual harassment and that the prison's EEOC coordinator had even
remarked that the "reason the inmates hit on [the female correctional
officers] is that they're a bunch of lesbians. 7 5 Prior to the issuance of
the IG report, internal affairs continued to investigate Freitag, finding
76that she had made false accusations. This led to her termination shortly
before the IG report was issued.77
At trial for her Title VII claims and a First Amendment claim for
retaliation, a jury unanimously found for Freitag, awarding her $500,000
in economic damages, $100,000 in non-economic damages, and $100 in
punitive damages against the warden and other named individuals, all of
whom were found jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the
78
compensatory damages. For our purposes, given Garcetti, we are
concerned in particular with her First Amendment retaliation claim. The
71. Id.
72. Id. at 535.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
76. Id. at 535-36.
77. Id. at 536.
78. Id. at 537.
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Freitag defendants challenged their liability under this claim, in
particular claiming that her speech was not deserving of First
Amendment protection.79
The appellate court remanded Freitag's case to the district court,
holding that in light of Garcetti, the jury may not have received proper
instructions as to which speech was covered by the First Amendment. 80
First, the court noted that certain aspects of her speech were clearly
protected by the First Amendment-namely, her speech that participated
in the IG's investigation, her speech that reported problems to the IG,
and her speech that informed the state senator of circumstances at
Pelican Bay.81 This speech, consisting of complaints to a public official
and an independent state agency, was conducted in her role as a private
citizen, and addressed a matter of public concern, according to the
82
appellate court. The court noted that it was not her official duty, but
her duty "as a citizen" to subject this form of malfeasance in the prison
system to broader public scrutiny. 83 Additionally, the court believed that
the public interest was great in this case, noting that "[a] vast majority of
our state's prisoners will reenter the general population some day .... It
certainly would be of grave concern if those inmates were being released
into our neighborhoods from an environment in which the State of
California condoned sexually abusive behavior and the harassment of
women."
84
Not all of Freitag's speech was deemed worthy of First
Amendment protection, however. The internal forms that she prepared
and her complaints to the associate warden, the warden, and other prison
personnel were made pursuant to her official job duties as a correctional
officer, according to the appellate court. 85 Thus, this speech should have
86been excluded from the jury instruction on the First Amendment issue.
Finally, the letter that Freitag wrote to the Director of the California
79. Id. at 543.
80. Id. at 543-46.
81. Id. at 545.
82. Id.
83. Id. (emphasis omitted)
84. Id. at 545-46.
85. Id. at 546.
86. On remand, the district court must make a determination of whether its
inclusion constituted harmless error. Id.
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Department of Corrections had ambiguous status with regard to First
Amendment protection; using the Garcetti standard, the appellate court
was unsure whether it was "expected" that a correctional officer "may"
or "must" air a sexual harassment grievance to the level of the Director.
8 7
88On remand, the district court would have to address this issue.
Thus, the portions of Freitag's speech that were made internally-
those that addressed the administrative officers of the prison itself,
including the associate warden and warden, were found to be speech
without First Amendment protection. Only if they can receive protection
under her other claims-e.g., her Title VII claim of retaliation--can she
89
receive remedy for them. With regard to this speech, she is in no better
legal position than that of a private employee.
But why must she complain to political or other outside
governmental officials in order to preserve her First Amendment claims?
Like Ceballos, she was attempting to protect the public from an allegedly
corrupt governmental entity by working to fix the problems within the
entity herself. In Ceballos' case, overreaching by the district attorney's
office could have led to more improperly issued search warrants and easy
(but inappropriate) conviction, something that the public has a right to be
concerned about. In Freitag's case, failure to prosecute inappropriate
sexual behavior by inmates and failure to take claims of sexual abuse
seriously could have led to the ultimate release of prisoners who would
be ill-prepared to adapt to the norms of a civilized society, particularly
with regard to its treatment of women. Regardless of the positions taken
by either public employer, the public service performed by both Ceballos
and Freitag was conscientious and noteworthy, helping to protect the
public from potential misconduct. The public was an interested
stakeholder in both cases. There was no assessment in either case of the
amount of so-called "disruption" that may have occurred in their
respective workplaces, because Garcetti does not require any such
87. Id.
88. Id. Note that the appellate court did not provide clear guidance on what is
meant by "made pursuant to official job duties." Words like "expected" and "may"
do not suggest that "pursuant to official job duties" be restricted to required speech,
but could in fact be broader.
89. Here, the internal speech itself would have to be found causally linked to
her dismissal.
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
finding. Instead, the potential for such disruption-the theoretical
possibility of loss of employer control-implies that speech made in
pursuit of official job duties no longer merits First Amendment
protection."
Additionally, even in Freitag there was no clear delineation of
whether Freitag's speech was compelled or discretionary or to whom it
had to be made to be considered "pursuant to official job duties." She
certainly had the right to initiate discipline for inmates that engaged in
inappropriate sexual behavior, but whether she was required to do so is
unclear.91 Soliciting the aid of appropriate supervisory personnel was
undoubtedly within her job description, and may have been required if
inmates disregarded her other attempts to control them. There was no
discussion of which personnel were "appropriate" for this purpose,
however. Her complaints to the associate warden and warden that
nothing was being done and that her authority was undermined were
arguably not required, even if these were the appropriate personnel to
receive such complaints. She was not reporting inmate behavior per se;
she was lamenting the lack of follow-through and support from prison
officials. Instead, these complaints can be viewed as taking important
steps to protect herself in the event of a sexual harassment lawsuit.
Nonetheless, all of Freitag's internal speech was viewed as being made
pursuant to official job duties.
In Ceballos' case, because all of his discipline appeared to be
92based on unprotected speech of this type, he had no recourse. In
90. The Supreme Court noted that speech can be restricted by the employer
when it "has some potential" to effect the operation of the public employer.
Garcetti, 547 at 418. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, noted that he did not
consider Ceballos' speech "inflammatory or misguided," which suggests that it was
not disruptive but merely undesired. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to
the majority opinion, id., at 423). Note the similarity with private employment
situations, where "disloyal" speech could be speech that an employer considers to be
disruptive. See supra note 43.
91. In fact, one lieutenant ordered her not to initiate discipline in at least one
instance. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92. The majority did not mention some of Ceballos' other activities, which
could also have given rise to his alleged discipline. For example, Ceballos had
spoken at the Mexican-American Bar Association meeting about misconduct in the
Sheriffs Department and problems with policies in the District Attorney's office.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 443 (Souter, J., dissenting). Whether any of this additional
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Freitag's case, because she persistently presented her case to elected
officials, some of her speech maintained First Amendment protection.
However, the fact that she sought a remedy within the SHU and Pelican
Bay prison system meant that she could potentially be terminated for that
speech.93
CONCLUSION
The Garcetti case, although representing a line of employer-
oriented Supreme Court cases that demonstrate hostility toward
interference with even a public employer's business judgment, goes even
further in suggesting that there is a bright-line between public employee
speech offered in pursuit of official job duties and other speech that
public employees might offer. I have suggested in this article that the
Supreme Court is looking through the lens of a typical business student,
failing to understand the important service role attached to public
employment. In doing so, the Supreme Court has allowed the loss or at
least devaluation of an important aspect of public employment which
should be of concern to all of us as citizens-the ethical, public
watchdog role that public employees are in a unique position to provide.
Speech made pursuant to official job duties could address "official
dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious
wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety,, 94 but it would no longer be
protected by the First Amendment when it is made internally.
Garcetti imposes the private employment model for workplace
speech on the public sector. Although this model appears to provide for
greater employer control of speech, and thus greater employer control of
workplace functioning, it does not necessarily lead to enhanced
speech could have been found to have resulted in any disciplinary measures, and
whether it would have been protected under a statute such as Title VII, is unclear.
93. Because she brought a claim of retaliation under Title VII, her speech
found to have been made pursuant to her official job duties-regarding sexual
harassment and the lack of the prison's willingness to address it-may also be found
to have led to her dismissal in violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
94. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting). Here, Justices Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsberg suggest that the Pickering test could be used in a manner such
that only these types of comments could favor the employee.
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workplace efficiency. To the extent that the organization itself is in the
best position to correct problematic workplace issues, it is more efficient
to have speech directed internally, to the personnel that need to be aware
of wrongdoing or dangerous situations and are able to address it swiftly
and effectively. This avenue now seems to be foreclosed for public
employees who speak pursuant to their official job duties. Only by
speaking outside of their official job duties, or by speaking to external
audiences, can public employees receive First Amendment protection for
speech that their employers find problematic, threatening, or disruptive.
